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I Introduction
In recent decades, there were two simultaneous effects in most of the industrialized countries.
Declining birth rates on the one hand were accompanied by increasing life expectancies on the other hand. Due to these trends, traditional pay-as-you-go pension systems face increasing problems, since the benefits of the retirees are primarily funded by contributions from the labour force. Without tremendous changes, the contributors-beneficiaries ratio will decrease, leading to a cash shortage in these types of pension systems. Figure 1 shows the development of this ratio from 1950 to 2050 within the G7-countries. It has been assumed that individuals aged 20 to 64 were contributors; the ones aged at least 65 beneficiaries. The contributorsbeneficiaries ratio declined from 6.7 : 1 in 1950 to 3.9 : 1 in 2004. According to projections, a further decline to 2.1 : 1 in 2050 is expected. 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034 2038 2042 2046 2050 
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The figure depicts the development of the ratio between the potential contributors and benefactors of a pensions system in the G7-countries in total. The potential contributors are those aged 20 to 64. The potential benefactors are defined accordingly as the population aged 65 and older. Calculations are based on data of the United Nations Population Database.
Funded pension systems, in which individuals save during their working life to build up a capital stock that suffices to finance their expenses as retirees seem to be a reasonable alternative to unfunded ones. Hence, current reforms have put a stronger emphasis on funded pension systems. Nevertheless, it is argued that these systems can also be influenced by demographic changes. Large generations retiring at once might want to withdraw substantial amounts from capital markets, which could result in a significant decline of asset prices, a phenomenon referred to as Asset Meltdown. If such relationship between demographic structure and asset returns exists, it is questionable whether funded pension systems could help solve the problem of financing pension systems for aging populations.
Contradicting the Asset Meltdown hypothesis is an "Asset Meltup" hypothesis. If a nation is aging, the working population is decreasing. The decrease in work force might lead to a situation where labor becomes the limited production factor. This in turn would imply that the price for labor would increase relative to the price of capital. Consequently, the demand for capital could well be increasing, which would result in an "Asset Meltup."
The arguments founding the Asset Meltdown phenomenon only hold ceteris paribus, if at all.
Asset prices in international capital markets do not only depend on national demographical changes. As empirical research based on Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) has shown, a substantial part of asset returns is driven by macroeconomic factors. Following this logic, our paper empirically analyzes the impacts that changes in demographic structure have on asset prices in a multifactor model. The outline of the paper is as follows: section II reviews the relevant literature. Section III provides the description of demographic as well as macroeconomic factors, and section IV describes the specification of the model. Section V introduces the data, section VI describes the tests of assumptions. Section VII documents our empirical results. Section VIII contains a brief summary.
II Literature Review
The Asset Meltdown phenomenon has been addressed in the literature from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Our review of the literature follows this classification. In an early empirical examination, the impact of demographic structure on asset returns is discussed by Mankiw/Weil (1989) , who analyzes the impact of demographic changes on real estate prices in the US and predicted a sharp decline in prices due to the changing demands of the baby boomers. A similar Canadian study by Engelhardt/Poterba (1991) does not find any significant correlation. Börsch-Supan (1993) predict no substantial changes in German real estate prices until 2020 and predict slightly decreasing prices thereafter due to changing demand by an aging population. A rise in the average age in the US is found by Bakshi et al. (1994) to correspond to a rise in the risk premium of a S&P500-portfolio. Claude et al. (1997) find a relationship between the average age of the population in the US and long-horizon returns of the S&P 500. On the contrary, Poterba (2001 Poterba ( , 2004 does not find any systematic relationship between demographic structure and returns on stocks, bonds and treasury bills.
He analyzes data for the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom and finds empirical evidence that coefficients differ significantly across the countries and asset classes. For the United States he notices a negative relationship between the percentage of the population aged 40 to 64 and bond returns, whereas for Canada he discovers a positive relationship. Both of these findings are significant. Ang/Maddaloni (2003) analyze the relation between logarithmic demographic changes and risk premiums on equity for 20 different countries including the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany. Similar to Poterba (2001), they find some significant relationships between demographic structure and asset returns. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of these relationships differs substantially between countries.
In the context of a macroeconomic multifactor model, Davis/Li (2003) examine the impact of demographic changes on the returns of stocks and bonds. Jamal et al. (2004) also analyze the impact of demographic structure on stock prices in the United States and the United Kingdom and show that the proportion of the population in the prime earning age has had a direct influence on stock prices. A Lucas asset-pricing model is used by Martin (2005) to show empirically that the primary force underlying the evolution of real house prices was the systematic and predictable change in the working age population driven by the baby boom. Yoo (1994b) and Goyal (2004) do not address the Asset Meltdown phenomenon directly, but instead examine the impact of demographic factors on asset holding and capital flows. Yoo (1994b) analyzes asset holdings and finds that demographic factors other than age, such as sex and ethnicity, have substantial influence on asset holdings of US-Americans. Goyal (2004) considers both out-and inflows of free capital to the US stock market and finds outflows to be positively correlated with the number of persons aged 65 and over, but negatively correlated with the number of those aged 45 to 64. A plausible interpretation might be that those aged 45 to 64 are in their prime earning years and are saving substantial amounts of their income for retirement, which they want to invest (at least partly) into the stock market. At about the age of 65 when they retire, they begin withdrawing these assets as retirement income.
The economic impacts of an aging society are also addressed by various authors from a theoretical perspective. Yoo (1994) predicts that the baby boom would cause a temporary decline in the capital-labour ratio. Employing an overlapping generation model, Brooks According to their model, current movements in stock markets are two to three times greater than demographic changes can explain.
In an earlier paper, Poterba (2001, p. 583) gives three principal suggestions for further empirical research:
• Internationally integrated capital markets: "Any attempt to assess the future link between asset returns and demographic structure must also consider the potentially important role of integrated world capital markets."
• Reaction to shocks: "A second issue […] concerns the timing of any asset market reaction to demographic shocks." The 'news' about demography is revealed when cohorts are born, not when they reach their prime saving years".
• Control for nondemographic factors: "Finally, the current analysis has ignored a wide range of nondemographic factors that may affect equilibrium real returns and asset prices."
These suggestions are addressed in the following empirical examination.
III Demographic and Macroeconomic Factors
According to economic theory, individuals wish to smooth consumption over their lifetime (Modigliani/Brumberg (1954 ), Friedman (1957 , Ando/Modigliani (1963) ). Due to this socalled life-cycle hypothesis, savings differ with income. As income tends to increase with age until retirement, savings should be low for younger individuals and higher for middle-aged people. Because income is in most cases substantially lower after retirement, retirees' savings should be negative. Positive savings tend to increase the demand for assets, while dissavings tend to increase the supply of assets.
Poterba ( Demographic variables as well as their growth rates are usually highly autocorrelated, and thus far from being unpredictable. In efficient capital markets, changes in prices should only be driven by new information (shocks). Therefore forecasts for the demographic variables were computed using an AR(p)-model, whose coefficients have been estimated in rolling regressions based on all observations that were available up to that point in time. For each estimation the lag p < 3 was chosen according to the Schwarz criterion. As a maximum lag of p = 3 did not improve the forecasts significantly, the maximum lag was not extended to avoid loosing too many observations. Another reason for not choosing a higher maximum lag was the problem of numerical instability. An ARMA(p) was also tested, but due to the limited number of observations, its results depended heavily on the initialisation of the shocks, which resulted in a strong effect on the results. The idea of calculating shocks using an ARMA(p)-model was therefore rejected. For estimating the shocks using a VAR, the number of observations was too limited.
In order to address the issue of integrated international capital markets, the demographic factors were not only calculated for the countries under consideration but also for all G7-countries as a whole, which makes it possible to include a potential impact of international demographics on asset prices in the respective national markets.
When analyzing unexpected changes in cohorts' magnitudes, one notes that they are mainly driven by (unexpected) shifts in mortality probabilities and fertility rates. Changes in mortality rates for the cohorts in concern are highly correlated. Thus, shifts in life expectancy can be regarded as a condensed measure for all changes in mortality probabilities. Taking all the above said into consideration, models including shocks in life expectancy of a new born and fertility rates as demographic factors were computed.
With exception to studies such as Davis/Lee (2003) and Poterba (2004) , most of the models only include demographic factors as explanatory variables, thus ignoring other factors that may affect equilibrium asset prices. It is quite likely that the models are underfitted, implying that the coefficients in the regressions might be biased. Empirical research based on Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) starting with Chen/Roll/Ross (1986) has shown that a large part of asset returns is driven by macroeconomic factors. In addition to demographic factors, unexpected changes in the growth rates of GDP, exports, exchange rate to USD, oil price, inflation, longterm yield and the spread between long and short term rate were also controlled for. In our sample, changes in growth rates of oil price as well as exchange rates can be considered as unexpected. Shocks for the other macroeconomic variables are calculated using the same estimation procedure as described above for demographic variables. Poterba (2001) 
IV Regression models
Let le c, t denote the life expectancy and fr c, t the fertility rate, both at time t in country c. The third set of regressions is then defined as 
In an attempt to use the cross section dimension, the parameters for (2), (3) and (4) were also estimated using a panel approach with α i, c = α i and β j, i, c = β j, i for all c.
V Data
Demographic data was obtained from the United Nations Population Database.
The data on stocks, bonds, treasury bills and inflation was obtained from Unlike the data for conventional assets, real estate data for is only available for parts of the sample. For each country, the reliable representative index with the longest history was chosen. Furthermore, the construction of the price indices and the observed market is different in all countries. This is due in part to national differences in housing standards (for example, wooden houses are typical for Japan, where in most locations buildings must be adapted to potential earthquakes). Thus, the real estate indices must be regarded as proxies for prices of typical housings in the corresponding countries. 
VI Tests of Assumptions
To rule out the opportunity of spurious regressions, the time series was first tested for stationarity using various tests. As such tests are known to sometimes lead to different results, several of them were applied to obtain valid conclusions. For the analysis of the time series, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test maximizing the Schwarz Info Criterion with a maximum lag of 10, the Phillips-Perron-Test, both with sample-size-adjusted values due to (1996) , and the NG-Perron test-statistics and the ERS test-statistics were applied.
MacKinnon
Further the null-hypothesis of stationarity due to Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) , hereafter referred
to as KPSS, was tested. The KPSS-test is an asymptotic one; its finite distribution depends on the number of observations and the lag chosen to estimate the long-run variance. The BartlettKernel and the Newey-West (1987) bandwidth were chosen. The finite sample distribution for the trend-stationary case does not differ significantly from the asymptotic KPSS-distribution according to Hornok/Larsson (2000) . Therefore, the critical values given in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) were applied to test for the null-hypothesis of stationarity. 5 As the null of nonstationarity could not be rejected in several cases, the regressions' residuals were also controlled for stationarity. Residual based test were applied with adjusted values according to Phillips/Ouliaris (1990) . To avoid the spurious regression problem, the determining variables were tested for multicollinearity in two steps. First, the bivariate correlations were calculated. If a correlation was not less than 0.8, one of the factors was omitted from the regression model. If possible, demographic variables were not eliminated. Second, the remaining factors were tested for multivariate correlation. Again, to avoid eliminating demographic variables, macroeconomic variable and AR-term were tested first and omitted in case of a variance inflation factor VIF ≥ 10.
VII Results
The results for the regression model with domestic demographic data (eq. 2) in is the population of middle aged people (aged 40-64). The coefficients of various control variables can be found in the appendix. Coefficients that are significant at the 1%-level (5%, 10%) are marked with *** (**, *). T-values are given in parentheses. NA denotes that the coefficient could not be estimated due to multicollinearity. Table 3 contains the result for the models with life expectancy and fertility rate as demographic variables. Here, 15 out of 64 estimations are significant. If the hypothesis of an Asset Meltdown holds, the coefficients for shocks in life expectancy should be negative, and positive for shocks in fertility rate. However, 6 out of 8 significant coefficients for For housing, only two significant coefficient estimators can be observed, of which only one has the expected sign. Coefficients that are significant at the 1%-level (5%, 10%) are marked with *** (**, *). T-values are given in parentheses. NA denotes that the coefficient could not be estimated due to multicollinearity.
As the findings do not show a clear pattern, several variations of the regression models have been estimated, where the percentages of the population aged 20 to 39, 40 to 64, and 65 and older were also used. Furthermore, to address the question of whether a potentially different dissaving behaviour of retirees at different age has an impact on asset prices, the group of retirees was split into those younger than 80 and those 80 and above. The percentages were then calculated accordingly; for the ratios, the population of those aged 80 and above was taken as the denominator. The results of these models did not show the existence of a consistent relationship between asset returns and demographic variables. Again, a few coefficient estimators proved to be significant, but they do not indicate any systematic link.
Additionally, to check the robustness of the results, shocks were computed using a AR(p)-model, now allowing for p ≤ 3. A re-estimation of all variations of the regression models shows that various coefficient estimators for the demographic variables change in magnitude as well as in sign.
One might argue that some of the examined asset markets, especially those for real estate, are not information efficient. Therefore, instead of shocks, changes of the variables were also used as explanatory variables in the regressions. All regressions described above were also run with nominal returns as the response variable and inflation as an additional macroeconomic factor. Controlling for cointegration was also tried. None of these tests resulted in any convincing empirical evidence of a relationship between demographic factors and returns.
VIII Conclusion
This paper analyzes the interrelation between demographic factors and asset returns in the G7-countries to verify the Asset Meltdown hypothesis empirically. Demographic factors were regressed on real asset return controlling for changes in the macroeconomic environment. To capture only unexpected changes, shocks for both demographic and macroeconomic variables were used in the regressions. None of the various estimation results provided evidence for a systematic relationship between demographics and asset markets.
These findings could be due to various causes. The variation of the demographic variables is quite small and identifying relationships between two variables, of which at least one is rather stable, is generally a challenging problem. A second reason could be the construction of the shocks. It is quite possible that the market participants do not react to unexpected changes in demographics of a small order of magnitude. Instead, they might react to changing appreciations of the economic impact of aging societies which are not captured by the times series used here.
We can neither prove a decrease in asset returns as a result of an aging society, nor can we empirically disprove the existence of a relationship between asset returns and demographic structure. Nevertheless, within the limitation of our models, the results suggest that Asset Meltdown is fiction rather than fact.
